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Abstract
This paper reports from an ongoing multidisciplinary, ethnographic study that is exploring the views,
values and practices (the ethical frameworks) drawn on by professional staff in assisted conception units
and stem cell laboratories in relation to embryo donation for research purposes, particularly human
embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, in the UK. We focus here on the connection between possible
incidental ﬁndings and the circumstances in which embryos are donated for hESC research, and report
some of the uncertainties and dilemmas of our staff participants. We explore the views of our study
participants in relation to two themes: (1) rights to information and anticipating how donors might be
informed about future research ﬁndings and (2) occupational work goals and trust.
Introduction
The term incidental ﬁnding (IF) has been deﬁned by Wolf
et al.
1 as ‘a ﬁnding concerning an individual research par-
ticipant that has potential health or reproductive impor-
tance and is discovered in the course of conducting
research but is beyond the aims of the study’ (p. 219).
Examples for the purposes of this paper might be genetic
information that may be produced as part of future research
projects, or the discovery of viral contamination in a
human embryonic stem cell (hESC) line that was not
tested for (because not yet discovered when the embryos
were ﬁrst donated or the UK Stem Cell Bank [UKSCB]
ﬁrst received the stem cell line).
Communicating information from IFs back to the
original donors of human biological material to research
touches upon some of the most important conﬂicts in
bioethics. These concern the right of individuals to
control of their own medical information versus the useful-
ness of medical information on a larger scale (family,
population groups, national and global);
2 the right of indi-
viduals to such knowledge versus the right not to be
informed;
3–5and the difﬁculty of adhering to the principle
of clear and informed consent for research participants
when researchers cannot predict or control many of the
future implications of participation.
6–8 These issues also
bring into sharp relief the relationship between clinical
and research ethics as a key aspect of the current emphasis
on the ‘translation’ of science
9 to the clinic and beyond.
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of assisted conception unit (ACU) and hESC research staff
to contribute to the literature on social and ethical aspects
of disclosure of IFs to research participants (in this case
embryo donors) and promote discussion of the issues. We
focus on the connection between the circumstances in
which embryos are donated for hESC research in the UK
and the possible future disclosure of IFs (concerning
genetic, viral or bacteriological information) to embryo
donors.
Following this introduction we set out the background
to the particular case of IFs in hESC research in the UK.
We then go on to report on this aspect of our ongoing mul-
tidisciplinary study on ethical frameworks for donation of
embryos for hESC research in three linked ACUs and
stem cell laboratories. Professional clinical and hESC
research staff articulated some uncertainties, dilemmas
and concerns about the policies and practices that are in
place or may be needed regarding communication of IFs
to embryo donors. After a description of the methods
used in the study, we explore the views of our study partici-
pants in relation to two themes: (1) rights to information
and anticipating how donors might be informed about
future research ﬁndings and (2) occupational work goals
and trust.
Background
In the UK, the Human Embryology & Fertilisation
Authority (HFEA) approves and licenses all studies on
human embryos, and requires that when stem cell lines
are grown from human embryos, a sample from those
lines should be deposited in the UKSCB so that approved
stem cell researchers from the UK and abroad can access
them for further research. The embryos used for this
research are those that patients cannot, or choose not to,
use for their own treatment. The assessment of their
likely viability is determined by embryologists in the
ACU (see Note [a]). Embryos that are judged unsuitable
for transfer to the woman’s womb at three to ﬁve days
after fertilization, or cryopreservation for a later ‘frozen
embryo transfer’, may be discarded or donated to research,
including hESC research. In the latter case, they may be
donated to stem cell laboratories directly linked to the
ACU where the donors have received treatment or to
other laboratories. Consent for donation of embryos to
hESC research therefore takes place in ACUs, after
embryological assessment. Fulﬁlment of the requirements
of proper consent from embryo donors may be the respon-
sibility of nurses, clinicians or stem cell coordinators. An
initial consent process is undertaken before treatment
commences using a standard HFEA form. If patients are
willing to consider donating embryos to research, a
further process of consent to a speciﬁc research project
takes place once the potential donors know if they have
embryos that will not be used for their own treatment.
The UK national network of human embryonic stem
cell coordinators (hESCCO – see Note [b]) drew attention
to some potential dilemmas arising from the current
regulations concerning feedback of information to donors
of embryos for hESC research, and therefore problems for
the donation consent process.
10 The UKSCB Code of
Practice (COP)
11 recommends ‘that donors are informed
that no individual feedback will be given on tests per-
formed by the UKSCB or research results of subsequent
studies unless in the unlikely event that the UK Stem
Cell Bank Steering Committee (SCBSC) considers that
donors should be contacted in relation to conﬁrmed test
results of direct relevance to the donor’s, or the donor’s
family health’ (p. 17) (see Note [c]). In addition, the
COP only requires that informed consent to donate
embryos for hESC research should include conﬁrmation
of ‘whether any information emerging from tests done on
the genetic material will be fed back to donors’ (p. 15,
italics added). Further, the COP requires that donors
must consent in writing whether they agree to be contacted
in future. These stipulations could be interpreted as allow-
ing researchers to rule out any further information feed-
back. However, that would be inconsistent with the
SCBSC’s option to re-contact donors in particular circum-
stances. In short, there appears to be room for confusion
because the ultimate decision whether or not to contact
donors lies with the SCBSC, yet the extent to which
current consent forms ensure that donors would be able
to choose to receive such information or not in the
future is unclear. Bell and Devaney
12 argue that such
gaps and overlaps, and the lack of a comprehensive and
cohesive regulatory system to govern stem cell research,
pose a signiﬁcant hindrance to the progress of stem cell
science in the UK.
In 2008 the MRC/BBSRC Stem Cell Dialogue study
13
reported that general acceptance (among members of the
public, specialists and experts who participated in the
study) of approaching assisted conception patients to
donate embryos for hESC research hinges on assumptions
that fully informed consent will be obtained, and that all
clinical and scientiﬁc endeavours will be regulated effec-
tively. However, ‘the difﬁculty of monitoring the ultimate
use of stem cells lines created through embryos was
acknowledged’ (p. 40), including the question of
‘whether stem cell banks should have to tell donors if
they discovered diseases in their cells which would affect
them later in life’ (p. 24). The report suggests that ethics
committees will increasingly need to account for donor
and public views as the science develops, and that
‘advances in the ﬁeld were seen to precipitate major chal-
lenges for regulation and informed consent – particularly
in terms of the development of different treatments from
embryonic stem cell lines and governing the purposes to
which research was put’ (p. 61), and in the context of
global access (from countries that may have different
applicable regulations) to UK banked stem cell lines. It
is therefore important to try to ensure that current
consent processes will allow future researchers using
hESCs to have documentary evidence that the embryos
have been ethically obtained. Yet difﬁculties experien-
ced at the UKSCB in gaining adequate ‘paper trails’
have shown how challenging it can be to foresee the
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14
We focus on IFs in hESC research for several reasons.
First, there has been substantial debate about making
intended and foreseeable research results available to partici-
pants, yet there has been little research on how researchers
should anticipate and manage the discovery of IFs in
human subjects research
1 and there are important differ-
ences between intended and incidental research ﬁndings.
For example, IFs are discovered by researchers but the
information may be beyond the aims of the original
study. One consequence of this is that the researchers
may not be certain how to interpret the ﬁndings, and
they may need to refer to clinical colleagues to consider
instigating clinical standard tests before deciding on how
to deal with the implications of disclosure of information
to donors. There is also a signiﬁcant literature on disclo-
sure of IFs following clinical investigations but less on dis-
closure following research results. For example, Lucassen
and Parker
15 discuss the closely related but only partially
analagous ethical issues in relation to disclosure of misat-
tributed paternity in clinical genetic family studies, but
there is little on disclosure of IFs relating to genetic
research, for example following genomic microarray analysis
or large-scale genomic epidemiology research. There is a
lack of research on the management of IFs in stem cell
research, but there is evidence of incomplete consensus
on policy and practice regarding IFs in research more gen-
erally. Wolf et al.’s
1 recent multidisciplinary empirical and
normative evaluation of the ethical, legal, scientiﬁc and
clinical implications of IFs and how they have been
handled in research in the US stresses the importance of
achieving consensus on this issue, as the challenges are
becoming more serious, particularly as genetic research
technologies become more powerful and large-scale. Wolf
et al. argue that there is a need for greater clarity among
funding, academic and ethical review bodies as to the
ethical duties of researchers regarding IFs in research,
and Lawrenz and Sobotka’s analysis
16 of publicly available
guidance and consent forms (mainly but not exclusively
from the US context) concluded that there is ‘very little
public guidance available for researchers as to how to
deal with incidental ﬁndings...[and] the guidance avail-
able is not consistent’ (p. 255). Similarly, the inter-
national comparative analysis by Chadwick et al.
4 of 27
policies on ethical guidelines for biobanks found a great
diversity among existing guidelines on the topic of feed-
back to participants. Topics on which they found variation
in guidance included whether investigators or biobanks
should be obliged to inform research participants about
IFs; whether participants should be informed directly, or
through appropriate clinicians; whether anonymity
should be complete or reversible; and the issue of partici-
pants’ rights to know and not to know. It has been
argued in the US context that there are increasing
public expectations for the return of research results in
various forms
17 and Knoppers et al.
18 claimed that prin-
ciples for international ethics guidelines on disclosing, in
certain circumstances, individual genetic research results
to participants have now emerged: ‘At the international
level, there now exists an ethical duty to return individual
genetic results subject to the existence of proof of validity,
signiﬁcance and beneﬁt...the right of the research partici-
pant not to know also has to be taken into consideration’
(p. 1170). The evidence that such principles are emerging
is signiﬁcant because of the national and international
collaborative nature of hESC research and the need
for scientiﬁc research to proceed across diverse jurisdic-
tions, despite a lack of complete consensus or harmonized
regulation.
19,20
We conclude from these indications for concern that if
embryo donors to hESC research, clinicians, scientists and
ethics committees are to be conﬁdent that consent is sufﬁ-
ciently informed and effective within the UK, and consist-
ent with the emerging international principles, there is a
need for greater knowledge of how these issues affect clini-
cal practice and consenting processes in particular. Our
position as a multidisciplinary team engaging in empirical
study of bioethical issues is to provide insight into the con-
texts in which consent to embryo donation for hESC
research is taken, which is under-represented in the litera-
ture. In this paper we report the views of staff working in
two UK ACUs and linked stem cell laboratories and inter-
pret their comments from a social science perspective.
Thus the paper responds to the call for multidisciplinary
empirical work on bioethical issues,
21–23 and in particular
adds to the small but growing body of ethnographic
research on the views and experiences of staff in these
ﬁelds in the UK.
24–27
Methods
This paper reports on one aspect of an ongoing multidisci-
plinary, ethnographic study that is exploring the views,
values and practices, or ethical frameworks, drawn on by
professional staff in ACUs and stem cell laboratories in
relation to embryo donation for research purposes, particu-
larly for hESC research. Following national and local
Research Ethics Committee approvals, the study methods
include clinical and laboratory observation, interviews
and ethics discussion groups (EDGs)
28 with staff from
three ACUs and linked stem cell laboratories in the UK.
Staff disciplines include nursing, obstetrics and gynaecol-
ogy, embryology, stem cell scientists, counselling, and
clinical and science management. As a multidisciplinary
team comprising three social scientists, an ethicist and a
consultant embryologist/ACU director, we are exploring
the social processes, meanings and institutions that frame
and produce ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical problems’ in these
settings.
The study sites are three ACUs in teaching hospitals
in England, which offer a mixture of National Health
Service (NHS), privately or ‘self-funded’ NHS treatment,
and three stem cell laboratories at the associated univer-
sities. The clinics provide a range of services including in
vitro fertilization (IVF) to women and couples who need
fertility treatment. Participants from across a broad range
of disciplines are being recruited by group introductions
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main researcher. The interviews are being conducted by
the main researcher (KE) as ‘guided conversations’,
29
lasting between one and two hours. Open-ended questions
and an informal interview schedule are used, with topics
such as the ethical differences between donation of
embryos for treatment and research, the details of how
and when consents are taken, how embryos are selected
for treatment and views on the regulation of clinical and
scientiﬁc aspects of reproductive technologies.
This paper draws on 25 staff interviews and two EDGs
held at two of our study sites between February 2008 and
February 2009. For our analysis of the transcripts we used
a modiﬁed version of the framework approach
30 following
close readings of the transcripts. Emerging themes from the
study as a whole, including those presented here, were dis-
cussed in the team meetings. While we do not claim that
the quotes we present here are statistically representative of
the views of staff in our sites, or in the UK generally, they
are indicative of common themes that arose from the ﬁeld-
work at these two sites, and quotes used in this paper are
intended to illustrate topics identiﬁed in the interviews
and EDGs. Note that for this paper we use the word
‘donors’ when referring to women and couples in the
context of their possible or actual donation of embryos
for research, and ‘patients’ when staff have used this
term. Also, we use the term ‘participants’ and broad occu-
pational categories (with study numbers) to describe the
members of staff who engaged in interviews and EDGs.
We acknowledge that for all of these practices some
readers might prefer other conventions.
Results
Although participants agreed on many local and national
policies relating to embryo donation and information pro-
vision in principle, they also expressed some uncertainties
based on their clinical or scientiﬁc experience that did not
seem to align with these policies, and commented on some
unresolved dilemmas concerning the contemporary and
long-term implications of IFs in hESC research. These
included considerations about communicating information
arising from IFs to embryo donors; demarcation of occu-
pational roles pertinent to consent processes; and how
these issues might ‘fold back’ into current clinical and
scientiﬁc practices in anticipation of some of the future
possible scenarios envisaged.
Our discussion of these data is organized into two
themes. The ﬁrst theme relates to embryo donors’ rights
to being informed about IFs and how this information
would be communicated to donors. The second theme
illustrates how participants in our study perceived differ-
ences in occupational work goals between clinical and
research staff, and explores the signiﬁcance of these for
determining who should take consents for donation of
embryos to hESC research, and who should communicate
possible future IFs to embryo donors.
Rights to information and anticipating how donors
might be informed about future research ﬁndings
As discussed earlier, the details of how donors might be
informed about serious medical issues which come to light
in the context of research with human embryos and hESC
lines are not set out in the HFEA COP (2006)
31 or
UKSCB COP (2006).
12 Participants commented on their
concernsaboutsomeoftheethicalandpracticalimplications
of this, referring to broad concepts about patients’ rights.
Embryologist 7 was unsure how information from IFs
would be communicated to donors. She weighed up how
it might seem easier just to say that all data will be irrever-
sibly anonymised against questions about patients’ rights to
information, and rights not to know, and the dilemmas this
would cause in practice:
‘You know, you can’t phone them up and say, “Oh do you
want to know about your stem cell line?” Because then
they’ll go, “Well why are you phoning?”’.
She reﬂected on the pros and cons of receiving unantici-
pated information, how it could affect a person’s quality
of life, their ability to get life insurance and then again
considered whether it would be better simply to be
treated if one becomes ill or be able to have the option
of preventive treatments:
‘Probably the simplest thing would be just to say that every-
thing is anonymised and there’s no feedback. But then...do
people have the right to know?’
Several other participants expressed similar wavering
thoughts: whether embryo donors should or should not
receive any further information; awareness that the current
guidelines could override such a wish; and the situation
that donors are not asked what their preferences would be.
A somewhat analogous scenario mentioned by some
participants is that of informing ‘altruistic’ sperm donors
(rather than the male partner in a treatment cycle) of
the results of standard tests for sperm count and viral infec-
tion. Participant 18, whose role involves research manage-
ment in the ACU and the stem cell laboratory, wished to
avoid worrying patients unduly, but also thought that it is
generally best to give people information. For sperm
donation, donors have to agree before giving the sample
how much information they want to receive, but this did
not always resolve the dilemmas:
‘You see young men come in...and you see their sample, and
you look at it and instantaneously, you know, “You’re not
going to have children naturally, or at least nigh on impossi-
ble”. And you have that twinge inside you that says, “Right,
you have to know this”. And when [they have indicated on
the form] that they don’t want to know anything... you’re
in that horrible position of saying, “I really want to tell
you, but I can’t”.’
Many of our research participants raised similar questions
about how to look ahead, at the point of donor consent,
to some of the decision-making processes that might
arise in the future. However it was difﬁcult to decide on
the best way of anticipating some of these difﬁculties.
Scientist 9 was in some respects against the idea of going
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them if an hESC line had been successfully derived from
their embryo. He thought this could be positive or nega-
tive, but most probably would be negative for women
who wanted to move on from treatment.
Scientist 19 thought that it would be good for people
to be able to specify particular preferences about further
types of knowledge that they would or would not welcome:
‘It’s all about giving people the freedom to do and give what
they want, and then them feeling like they have been in
control of that process, rather than them being steamrollered
and then coming out of it feeling a bit mangled and think-
ing, “All these people have just done this to me”.’
The range of views and uncertainties in this theme, includ-
ing the ideas staff expressed about patients’/donors’ rights
to information, and how this might be offered back to
donors, particularly if this might occur after a considerable
lapse of time, was found across participants in all disci-
plines. Aware that such information could be either
helpful or unwanted, they could foresee potential dilem-
mas because there are no arrangements currently in place
to allow donors to control the process themselves, other
than refusal to donate. They were unclear about how dis-
closure of information could best be handled without
knowing beforehand how individual donors would want
to be approached.
In the face of these dilemmas about how patients/
donors could be approached and informed about some
possible implications of embryo donation to hESC
research, many staff could not resolve all of the questions
they raised yet had to ﬁnd ways of acting within the
ethical expectations and standards of their professional
roles. We intend to discuss in more detail the relationship
between knowledge, control and voluntariness as require-
ments of informed consent for donors in this context else-
where. However, here we have shown how the long-term
and uncertain nature of hESC research presents clinical
staff with dilemmas because they cannot provide infor-
mation about all the future research possibilities that
may apply to hESC research, and this means donors’
knowledge and control is limited. Key questions for staff
involved with obtaining consents from donors are there-
fore, ‘How can consent be fully informed if the future
uses of the tissues are not known? What rights do
embryo donors have to information that emerges in
research involving stem cells using their embryos? Should
donors have more control over whether (or not) they
wish to receive such information?’
Occupational work goals, orientations and trust
For some staff, one resolution of the dilemmas discussed in
the preceding section was to draw on their belief that as
professionals with work goals and orientations that value
and respect patients’ main goal of achieving pregnancy,
they could be trusted to act in patients’ best interests.
This resolution is vulnerable to the ongoing difﬁculties
of interpreting best interest in particular cases, and there-
fore raises another key question: ‘Who can know what is in
the patient’s best interest in such circumstances?’ In this
section we focus on the ‘who’ in that question, and
discuss views from both clinical and research staff relating
to occupational work goals, orientations and trust.
It should be noted here that in these two sites and up
to the time we had completed the 25 interviews analysed
for this paper, there were no appointed stem cell coordina-
tors for a number of reasons, for example the clinics were
not at that time approaching couples to donate embryos
speciﬁcally to an hESC research project, although they
had in the past and envisaged doing so again. Nurses in
the two ACUs reported from here were responsible for dis-
cussing the HFEA consent forms couples are required to
consider before commencing treatment. These forms
require patients to state their preferences about donating
embryos to research in general. Some clinical staff (i.e.
nurses, doctors and embryologists) thought that research
staff (i.e. scientists and research managers from the hESC
research laboratory) would be responsible for providing
further information for speciﬁc research projects and
obtaining separate consent at a later stage, usually (in
these two clinics and during this period of the study)
when embryos had been cryopreserved and couples
decided they no longer wished to store them for their
own treatment. However, there were diverse views
among clinical and research staff about the principle of
separation between clinical and scientiﬁc research interests
(see Note [d]). Some clinical staff agreed that researchers
should ‘take consents’ (see Note [e]) on the basis that
clinical staff could not answer all the questions that
patients might have. For example, Nurse 25 said:
‘It should be someone doing the research mainly because...
they’re the experts really. And the questions that you might
get asked...it’s all sort of speciﬁc and I wouldn’t know it all
really’.
However, other clinical staff disagreed with this policy and
thought that clinical staff were the best people to discuss
research with potential donors because they believed
their work orientations were more ‘patient focused’, for
example helping patients achieve pregnancy. For
example, Embryologist 7 argued:
‘I have issues with [stem cell researchers obtaining consents]
because I think their job depends on getting embryos for
research...I think there’s a potential to pressurise patients...
it’s better almost [for] the person doing the treatment to ask
them to donate to research because if I’m doing the consent
to research, my primary objective is to get that patient
pregnant... I don’t think I am pressurising that patient at
all into research. My focus is always on treatment, not
research’.
Claims that clinical staff were more likely to have a
‘patient focus’ could also lead to further claims about
patients’ trust in clinical staff. Nurse 1 argued that the
treatment work goals in the clinic, in contrast to research
in the laboratory, meant that patients could put their trust
in the clinic staff. Most patients did consent to donating
embryos for research that they could not use for their
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stem cell research in the past as well:
‘That’s because they trust us. And therefore we’ve got to keep
our end of that right and make sure that we are doing our best
to get them pregnant because that’s what we’re about
really...if you’re a researcher, then you’ve got a different
agenda, haven’t you?’
A similar statement was made by Clinician 8. After setting
out a clear picture of how couples would be approached for
donation to research by staff who are ‘separate from any-
thing to do with clinical practice’, the clinician went on
to describe the perspective of patients who are interested
in donating embryos for research:
‘They see it as the unit that’s done its best to help them have
children, and who you hope therefore they feel quite good
about, endorses the decision to suggest donating for stem
cell research.’
These statements from the nurse and clinician are interest-
ing because they could be taken to imply that although the
different ‘agenda’ of researchers might stand in contrast
with that of the clinic, at the same time trust engendered
in the clinical relationship could be seen as facilitating
patients’ agreement to donation for research.
It is also important to note that at the time these state-
ments were made, most embryos eligible for donation to
research (in these units, at the time of our interviews)
had been in cryopreservation storage. It could be argued
that the passage of time since the couple were in active
treatment could mean relationships of trust with clinical
staff would be harder to claim. However, the clinical
staff making such statements had been employed in the
ACUs for a considerable length of time so might be
expected to be recognized by patients. They might also
contend that their clinical orientation, direct contact
with patients, or ‘patient focus’ formed the basis of the
trust relationship rather than long-term contact.
Embryologist 2 illustrated this view:
‘Although the stem cell team as a whole would understand
the ethical issues behind using human embryos and
gametes, I think sometimes they’re a little bit removed
from the patients to understand that, you know, it’s [the
patients’] kind of future babies, possible future babies, that
you’re using for research...it’s quite a delicate issue.’
Referring to ‘possible future babies’ in this way reﬂects a
patient focus because some patients do think and talk
about their embryos as ‘babies’, whereas stem cell lab
researchers talk about dealing with embryos and stem
cells, but not ‘babies’. The embryologist has also pointed
out that researchers are ‘removed’ from patients, so
despite understanding the ethical issues, they cannot
build up the kind of trust relationship clinical staff are
more able to do through direct contact with patients.
However, if research staff also expressed professional
values that upheld the principle of separation between
clinical treatment and research in the best interests of
the patient, this was not necessarily an indication of
prioritizing their research over patients’ treatment.
Scientist 17, for example, said:
‘Strictly speaking, I’m independent from all of that [treat-
ment], so the idea is that in order to avoid coercion of
patients, then the scientists don’t get involved with the
patients. ...[However] although I’m interested in research,
I actually personally would rather that people got pregnant
than me have an embryo. So I don’t feel that I would necess-
arily be particularly pushing them to do that, but I guess if
you’re going to make a rule, then it’s much safer and
cleaner to have scientists as a separate thing’.
Another reason this scientist gave for not feeling in the
best position to take consents for donation to stem cell
research was that as a scientist, s/he did not have training
for direct contact with patients.
Comments from our participants about different work
goals and uncertainties about possible future information
feedback suggest that the separation of work processes
and lack of full understanding of what might happen in
the future with stem cells derived from donors’ embryos
combined to create some concerns. Day-to-day pressure
of work did not allow clinical staff sufﬁcient time to
become fully informed about the future implications of
embryo donation, and lack of regular contact between
the teams exacerbated uncertainties about each other’s
current and future responsibilities. The opportunity to
meet in mixed discipline EDGs was appreciated for this
reason (ascertained in the post-EDG evaluation exercise),
as colleagues could learn about and discuss practices and
policies across the different staff groups.
In Fisher’s
32 study of how ethics are constituted ‘on the
ground’ in pharmaceutical clinical trials, similar concerns
about the separation of research and clinical relationships
were raised by research coordinators who experienced role
conﬂicts and potentially divided obligations to patients
and to pharmaceutical companies, and such conﬂicts led
to staff developing informal ethical practices in an
attempt to ‘reinsert care into research’ (p. 689). A
similar example of this everyday constitution of ethics
could be seen in our data, when many staff (both clinical
and research) took the position that if patients were
‘uncomfortable’ with any possible aspect of donation for
research, including not being able to know what some of
the implications might be, then it was simpler but also
ethically preferable to advise them not to donate. The
idea of patients and staff being ‘comfortable’ about particu-
lar processes (aspects of consent for example) was often
referred to and seemed to operate as a rule of thumb
when explaining their ethical positions. In these circum-
stances it could be argued that advising patients not to
donate solved both staff and patients’ problem of not
being ‘comfortable’, and allowed some staff to feel conﬁ-
dent that prioritizing clinical care over research meant
patients could trust them.
Discussion
There has to our knowledge been no social science inves-
tigation of the actual practices and policies for managing
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might arise from hESC research, and the consequent
ethical dilemmas that may be involved for clinical and
scientiﬁc staff, and this paper aims to address that gap.
However, there is an emerging body of literature on
the views of various stakeholders in the UK on ethical
and social issues relating to stem cell science. For
example, Franklin and Robert’s
27 ethnographic work in
this ﬁeld has documented the processes by which ethical
quality control, so essential to the future use of embryos
in the derivation of hESCs, centres on transferring
gametes and embryos from assisted reproduction settings
to stem cell laboratories. Plans for long-term and heavy
UK investment in hESC research emphasize its promise
for future utility in healing and cure,
33 and bioethical pro-
venance has become an essential tool in the international
brokerage of hESC research.
34 Yet Michael et al.
35 argue
that stem cell scientists themselves have articulated
vague and opaque futures that perform uncertainty and
wariness in the present. Our data suggest that this may
have some impact on ethical, clinical and social aspects
of embryo donation as staff seek to resolve the day-to-day
dilemmas linked with these uncertainties.
Roberts and Throsby
36 and Hallowell et al.
37 point out
ethical concerns stemming from the elision between
research and clinical care and the principle of separating
these two functions. Roberts and Throsby
36 address this
aspect of a UK research programme that offers women
undergoing IVF reduced fees for donating eggs to research
(as distinct from existing schemes for egg ‘sharing’ for
other couples’ treatment). They argue that ‘the research
nurse is positioned as a buffer between the patient and
the clinic’, but ‘the separation between the [research]
nurse and the clinical team is hard to sustain, particularly
for patients for whom nurses and clinicians remain inter-
connected actors within the clinical setting’ (p. 165).
Hallowell et al.
37 studied a similar ‘demarcation problem’
in clinical genetics, where ‘patients ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
differentiate genetic testing undertaken in research proto-
cols from that offered as part of their clinical management’
(p. 1) and argue that this is particularly important in
relation to consent processes. They point to increasing evi-
dence that participants in genetic epidemiological studies
‘expect to receive personal feedback about their genetic
risk status...even when it has been explicitly stated that
such information will not be forthcoming’ (p. 2), a point
echoed in the exploration by Dixon-Woods et al.
38 of
the ‘therapeutic misconception’ in consent to research par-
ticipation. For this reason, many of Hallowell et al.’s
37
research participants described means of avoiding this
problem by using the concepts of space and time to main-
tain boundaries between their clinical and research activi-
ties. Our data on the separation between clinical care and
hESC research also point to the use of space and time to
maintain boundaries, but also to lay claim to the trust of
patients. For example, many participants in our study (at
the time of the interviews) assumed that (frozen)
embryos would only be recruited at a later date after treat-
ment had ﬁnished, so time separated research from clinical
treatment. Everyday concerns about the separation of
clinical and research functions and possible re-contact of
donors about IFs in the future could be resolved to some
extent by resorting to a further assumption that responsi-
bility to handle decisions about re-contacting donors
would arise elsewhere from future discoveries (e.g. research-
ers rather than clinical staff, researchers in other places,
regulatory bodies or ethics committees). Thus some staff
use spatial and temporal concepts to demarcate the
future and other occupational groups as spaces in which res-
olution of possible conﬂicts might occur outside of the
boundaries of immediate clinical practice. This helps to
resolve, for example, what might be thought of as the intru-
sion of having to consider donation consent process and
dilemmas such as those discussed above regarding IFs from
hESCresearchintoclinicalrelationshipswithACUpatients.
Stephens et al.’s
14 detailed ethnography of the UKSCB
has illuminated how reliance on developing (professional)
social networks of trust to establish the ethical provenance
of stem cell lines became necessary because of the pre-
viously unforeseen need for otherwise absent documentary
evidence. Detailed scrutiny of applications to bank lines in
the future or from overseas seems (according to their
research) less, not more, likely, which suggests that
reliance on trust networks might also increase. In some
ways the importance of similar networks of trust can be
seen from our participants’ accounts of negotiating
between different clinical and research goals and responsi-
bilities and forming trust relationships with patients/
donors; and staff reliance on ethics committees and regu-
latory bodies to anticipate possible future contact with
donors in a way that those currently taking consents
would ﬁnd acceptable. However, another way of reading
this might be as an alert to members of ethics committees
whose role includes scrutinizing the accountability of
research, and consent in particular, with an eye to how dis-
closure of future discovery of IFs might be facilitated by
contemporary consent agreements.
Pertinent to this is that some of our research partici-
pants expressed concerns about donors of embryos for
research lacking an opportunity to indicate whether they
would not wish to be given information, which supports
the attention drawn to this issue by the hESCCO
group. This point offers some support for Manson and
O’Neill’s
39 critique of standard models of informed
consent in biomedical ethics, in which they argue that
regulators’ narrow focus on types of information to be dis-
closed by those who seek consent and on decision-making
in consent processes addresses only part of the problem,
and offers inadequate solutions to the kinds of concern
and uncertainty our participants raised. Some of their
concerns arise because the current codes of practice appli-
cable in the UK leave open possibilities for short- and
long-term problems relating to donor consent and poten-
tial future disclosure. For example, in addition to the
lack of clear protection of what some donors (and staff)
may regard as a right not to be informed, the guidelines
do not suggest how researchers could ensure communi-
cation about such information is sufﬁcient or effective;
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taking consents from donors as to how IFs would be
handled in practice once the SCBSC decides that donors
should be informed. Consequently, ethics committees
considering research protocols may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
envisage how effective forms of accountability will take
place in practice. Manson and O’Neill
39 propose new
ways of thinking about consent in terms of communicative
transactions to achieve intelligently placed trust or
refusal, and our data suggest that both clinical and research
staff are concerned that patients/donors should be able
to place their trust in staff since there is such a high
degree of uncertainty about possible future developments
in the ﬁeld of hESC research and therefore the exact
uses of the stem cells created from their embryos.
As these arrangements in regard to hESC research are
new and there is incomplete consensus or guidance on the
practical details of how information might be offered back
to donors, we think it premature to offer normative
comment at this stage. However, our observations and
analysis of interview and EDG data provide evidence of
clinical and research staff formulating and engaging with
important, ongoing issues:
† Obtaining fully informed consent in the absence of
certain knowledge regarding the future uses of tissues;
† Ascertaining the right of donors to information which
emerges in the course of research which relies on their
donated embryos;
† The extent to which donors can exercise control and
choice over whether or not they wish to receive such
information;
† The establishment of who possesses expertise when
judging the best interests of the donors.
We conclude that even if there are few IFs in hESC
research that are referred to the UKSCB Steering
Committee, these questions have an impact on how
consent processes in these circumstances can be fully
informed, and therefore on the quality of consenting pro-
cesses for thousands of assisted conception and preimplan-
tation genetic diagnosis patients. The possible future
impact of this for the ethical provenance of stem cell
lines, the progress of research and communications with
embryo donors has yet to be seen, but there is some evi-
dence that achieving greater consensus on communication
of IFs from research more generally is regarded as urgent.
We believe that the effort towards consensus and clarity
will be aided by further empirical research on how staff
in research laboratories, clinical units and research ethics
committees, as well as professional and lay members of
national policy-making and regulatory bodies have
addressed the discovery and management of IFs by hESC
researchers, donor views and experiences, emerging pol-
icies on possible future disclosure and the right not to be
informed, and to document instances of anticipation and
management of IFs that arise. Tracing the social, clinical
and ethical dilemmas for these parties would contribute
to empirical engagement with the challenges these pose
to a wider set of stakeholders than we have been able to
include in this study; and to the theoretical consideration
of continuing debates on informed consent in this setting.
Notes
[a] More detailed description of this process is not possible
within the space available for this paper: please see
Svendsen and Koch
40 and Ehrich et al.
25 for descriptions
of ACU clinical decision-making and determination of
what is a ‘spare’ embryo, and Cutting et al.
41 for detailed
information on a proposed embryological grading system for
the selection of embryos for treatment. Further information
about the regulatory arrangements for donation of embryos
for stem cell research and depositing stem cell lines in the
UK Stem Cell Bank can be found at www.hfea.gov.uk and
www.UKstemcellbank.org.uk.
[b] hESCCO was founded in 2004, with the aim of enhan-
cing cooperation between hESC derivation centres and
assisted conception units. Stem cell coordinators from
several centres, together with stem cell scientists, clinicians,
embryologists and social scientists, met twice a year to
discuss, inter alia, the considerable challenges in developing
a national protocol for patient information and consent for
embryo donation to stem cell research. In the two sites
reported from here, and at the time of these interviews,
there were no stem cell coordinators in post as envisaged
by hESCCO.
[c] At the time of writing, the SCBSC COP
11 refers to the sti-
pulations of the 2004 EU Tissue Directive
42 that embryo
donors should also be traceable in the event of a public
health concern, although the Directive itself is only con-
cerned with stem cell derivation for therapeutic application
and not in vitro research. Further, the COP notes that: ‘For
hES cell lines derived in research grade facilities clinical
use is unlikely. However, should such cell lines have unpar-
alleled therapeutic potential, regulatory approval for clinical
use may exceptionally be considered after detailed risk/
beneﬁt analysis’ (p. 16). This leaves open the question of
whether in that case the Directive stipulations in regard to
contacting embryo donors in the event of a public health
issue would then apply, but we put that question aside for
the purposes of this paper.
[d] Clinician EFED8 traced the inﬂuence of the Polkinghorne
guidelines on thinking through ethical implications
and guidelines for obtaining IVF embryos for hESC research;
however Pfeffer
43 points out that these were drawn up in
relation to aborted fetuses and not other types of tissue.
[e] ‘Doing’ or ‘taking’ consents were phrases all staff used to
refer to the process of explaining research projects to patients
and obtaining written consent from them to donate embryos
not used for treatment.
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